Das zweite Themenheft 2020 rückt den Begriff des Praktischen Wissens in den Mittelpunkt. In den begrifflichen Diskussionen stand lange Zeit Gilbert Ryles Unterscheidung zwischen den Wissensformen des »knowing how« und »knowing that« im Vordergrund. Erst in den letzten Jahren, im Zusammenhang mit einem neu erwachten Interesse an Elizabeth Anscombes Monographie ›Intention‹, wird die Bedeutung des praktischen Wissens als Wissen von Handelnden um ihre absichtlichen Handlungen für die Handlungstheorie wiedererkannt. Der Schwerpunkt »Praktisches Wissen« will vor diesem Hintergrund einerseits systematische Fragen aufgreifen, die sich aus den Diskussionen nach Ryle und Anscombe ergeben, nicht zuletzt um Verbindungslinien zwischen diesen beiden Konzepten zu reflektieren. Diese Debatte soll andererseits um Beiträge mit einem Fokus auf markante historische Positionen ergänzt werden.
Inhalt:
Jens Kertscher
Schwerpunkt:
Jens Kertscher
Abstract According to Anscombe, practical knowledge is necessary for intentional action. In this paper, this relationship is reconstructed against the background of another central insight of Anscombe, that actions are dependent on descriptions. Thus Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge can be understood as an answer to a conceptual problem, namely how one and the same process identified as intentional action can be known in different forms from the first-person perspective of an actor and the third-person observer perspective. This problem is first worked out, then Anscombe’s solution is explained in the context of an interpretation of §§ 45–48 of ›Intention‹. In contrast to Davidson’s position on the problem of action descriptions, the claim of Anscombe’s solution, which is directed against »Cartesian« models of the psychological vocabulary with which actions are explained, is made particularly clear.
Buy article Fabian Börchers
Abstract In a short passage towards the end of her book ›Intention‹ Elizabeth Anscombe briefly discusses the topic of »practical knowledge« in the sense of knowledge-how. I interpret this passage within the context of the general argument of Intention. I argue that although this passage seems to be only loosely connected to the main topic of the book and to Anscombe’s own understanding of the term »practical knowledge«, it contains a central insight: the thought that practical knowledge in Anscombe’s understanding of the term and what Ryle calls »knowledge-how« are not independently conceivable. Or, to put it more generally: Anscombe thinks that, at least when it comes to intentional action, the metaphysical concepts of form and capacity are mutually dependent and neither of the two can form the basis of a satisfactory discussion of the topic of rational action on its own.
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Abstract G. E. M. Anscombe introduced the concept of »practical knowledge« into contemporary action theory. According to Anscombe, in cases where someone’s action fails to be performed successfully, the error lies in what he or she is doing and not in what he or she is thinking, wherefore his thought is not mistaken, and thus still knowledge. But Anscombe also seems to believe that knowledge is factive, i.e. to know that p implies that p. Both claims are, however, in tension with each other, because my practical mistake prevents that my knowledge corresponds to a fact. This paper seeks to address the problem this tension poses for our understanding of practical knowledge. In § 1, I describe the problem. In § 2, I review Anscombe’s own response to the problem, and point out a difficulty for it. In § 3, I discuss three other attempts to deal with the problem, and argue that they are flawed. Finally, in § 4 I sketch my own solution.
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Abstract In this article Kant’s conception of practical reason is reconstructed in order to address a problem of effectiveness inherent in the space of reasons: How can actions be thought of as being free whilst at the same time being bound by the knowledge of practical necessity? Following Kant, the concept of law proves to be central to the transcendental cognition of the presuppositions of practical reasoning. The starting point of the transcendental argument is not the ordinary »moral« judgment, but the capability of the power of choice (Willkürfreiheit). The power of choice is executed via practical judgments, which can be understood as a practical knowledge with more or less satisfactory reasons. By interpreting the »paradox of method in a critique of practical reason«, an indirect argument uncovering the undeniability of a lawful form of practical knowledge can be reconstructed. Therefore, actions cannot be understood as single events that direct reasons into a world lacking any reference to reason. Rather, no intentional action is conceivable without a connection
to the form of practical knowledge.
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Essay:
Tea Lobo
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