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Following the work of Eickhoff (1988) and O’Shaughnessy (1998), the ›Yearbook of Psychoanalyses 74‹ on the theme Lie is dedicated to a relational dimension which has been widely neglected in the psychoanalytic tradition until now. This may be due to the fact that it was seen more as a contraindication to treatment. However, the underlying view that the liar is someone who is supposed to know what the truth is (Philipps in Forrester 1997) cannot be maintained. For, as occasionally someone who thinks to tell the truth is basically lying, it might as well be the case that someone who lies consciously, unconsciously tells the truth. So, how can we understand the problem of lying more precisely from the point of view of psychoanalysis? And, what role does lying play in psychoanalytic work?


  • John Forrester: Auf der Couch liegen. Auf der Couch lügen
  • Helmwart Hierdeis: Lüge, Scham und Angst im Traum
  • Gertrud Hardtmann: »Eine notwendige (?) Lüge wird zur Weltordnung« Franz Kafka: der Prozess - Josef K. und die einleitende Schrift zum Gesetz
  • Peter Möhring: Lügen haben lange Beine. Zur psychoanalytischen Sozialpsychologie des Betrugs
  • Angelika Ebrecht-Laermann: »Ich lüge immer« – »Ich lüge nie.« Paradoxales Lügen als psychotische Perversion des Denkens und der Objektbeziehungen
  • Helga Kremp-Ottenheym: »Ich mag die Menschen nicht« (Emma, 7 Jahre). Verneinung und Abwesenheit. Über den Anfang einer Kinderbehandlung
  • Joachim F. Danckwardt: »Er persönlich gibt alles gesagte preis«. Buchessay zu Ulrike May: ›Freud bei der Arbeit‹.


  • Howard Levine: Die grundlegende epistemische Situation. Die psychische Realität und die Grenzen der klassischen Theorie.
    [Abstract}[[While many of Freud’s formulations were restricted by the epistemological assumptions of his times, his creative genius allowed him to anticipate post-modern views that are at the cutting edge of contemporary analytic thinking. This paper attempts to examine the epistemological basis – what do we think we know and how do we think we come to know it? – for the shift in the aims of analysis from a predominant emphasis on uncovering mental contents to one that also includes the creation of mental contents and the strengthening of the instruments for thinking and the capacity for thought. A brief clinical example illustrates some of the clinical implications of this shift.}}

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